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DIA-TRIBE
Mark V. Tushnet*
.AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Laurence H. Tribe. Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press. 1978. Pp. lxix, 1204. $23.50.

It is hard to emerge from Professor Tribe's enterprise without the
feeling that Philip Roth's Dr. Spielvogel has offered the last word on
the subject: "So . . . . Now vee may perhaps to begin. Yes?" 1 The
treatise has been criticized from the right2 and praised from the
center,3 and I suppose my comments will inevitably be taken as the
view from the left. I prefer, however, to think of them as coming
from, say, the north - from a direction unrelated to the conventional liberal-conservative continuum. I shall examine Professor
Tribe's work with the aim of showing that its premises are hopelessly
contradictory. The popular allegiance to those premises demonstrates the need for a major reorientation of constitutional theory. 4
Professor Tribe's treatise is organized around four premises.
First, the aim of the Constitution of the United States is to secure
justice. Second, the Constitution does in fact - or can fairly be interpreted to - approximate the accomplishment of justice. Third,
the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution so as to promote justice. The first two of these premises are largely uncontroversial. Rawls tells us that justice is the first virtue of institutions. 5 And,
as I will argue by example in the next Section, the flexibility of legal
reasoning and the variety of the available precedents certainly provide enough room for the Constitution to be interpreted to promote
justice. The third premise is the one around which the standard controversies in constitutional theory rage. I shall not rehearse those
controversies here; Professor Tribe comes close to acknowledging
that his third premise is independent of the first two, and gives only
the weakest of arguments to support it.
Although I shall deal with difficulties in Professor Tribe's inter* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A. 1967, Harvard University; J.D., M.A.
1971, Yale University. - Ed.
1. P. ROTH, PORTNOY'S COMPLAINT 274 (1969).
2. See Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1174 (1979).
3. See Ginsburg, Book Review, 92 HARv. L. REv. 340 (1978).
4. I have suggested elsewhere the direction that such a reorientation might take. See
Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: Constitutional Law Scholarship in the Seven•
ties, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 1307 (1979); Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. SocY, Pun.
TCHRS. LAW 20 (1980).
5. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971). See also U.S. CONST. preamble.
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pretation of his third premise, the fundamental contradictions within· ,
the treatise emanate from the fourth premise: that relatively rec~nt
Supreme Court decisions establish doctrines that are reasonable approximations of justice. As we shall see, it matters little whether we
take 1968, the end of the Warren era, or 1980 as the date for examin-ing constitutional doctrine; Professor Tribe tends to choose the later
date and then to explain why current doctrine is almost as good as
Warren Court doctrine. From what we know about the rationality
with which the Court decides cases,6 the fourth premise is either
wildly implausible or rests on an invisible hand mechanism of truly
awesome power. Although Professor Tribe's enterprise might be understood as an argument for constructing such a me~hanism, he does
not do so and indeed talks in terms that are inconsistent with uie
invisible hand approach.
My argument is designed to show that one cannot treat constitutional law as establishing principles of justice. In Section II, I take
the first three premises seriously and explore what might happen if
we encouraged the Supreme Court to articulate principles of justi~e
in its constitutional decisions. I argue that it is impossible to join the
·fourth premise to what that exploration reveals, and that only a different kind of constitutional theory from Professor Tribe's can do the
job he thinks should be done.

I.

PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTION

Suppose we agreed with Professor Tribe that the Supreme,Court
should interpret the Constitution so that constitutional doctrine
stated principles of justice. In this Section, I shall examine what a
political philosopher might say about two substantive areas1 eq~al
protection and federalism, and how a political-philosopher-turn,edjudge might interpret the Constitution in line with Professor Tribe's
first three premises. I shall also compare the results with what Professor Tribe himself says. I shall argue that there may be a gross
disparity between the two efforts, and that the possibility of disparity
can be eliminated only by adopting Professor Tribe's fourth premise.
In doing so, however, those who follow Professor Tribe are committed to specific positions on issues that remain controversial among
political philosophers. Perhaps the philosophers are wrong; perhaps
Edmund Burke was a better philosopher than John Rawls and Robert Nozick. I invoke Burke to suggest a very powerful conservative
strain in Professor Tribe's work. Section II examines another aspect
of Professor Tribe's conservatism, and my Conclusion sugg~ts its
sources.
·
6. See generally B. WOODWARD &

s. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
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The Just .Distribution of Wealth: State Action and the Equal
Protection Clause

Someone who learned political philosophy from Professor Tribe,
or from reading law reviews, would be surprised to learn that the
central issue in political philosophy today, as it has been for at least a
century, is not whether or to what extent freedom of expression is
required, not whether abortion is morally permissible, not whether
remedial action that takes race explicitly into account is justified. In
many ways, indeed, those issues are shadows cast by the real one
that has animated philosophical discussion: put bluntly, the real issue is which social-economic system, capitalism or socialism, justice
demands. 7 That is what John Rawls and Robert Nozick are concerned with, and what they and their acolytes have to say about
other questions is largely derived from premises constructed to give
them leverage on that issue.
I take it that I do not have to say much about what capitalism is,
but I must say something about socialism. For the purposes of what
follows, I take socialism to be a system with two predominate characteristics: substantial though not necessarily complete equality in
the distribution of material wealth among all in the society, 8 and
substantial though not necessarily complete control by the society,
acting through appropriate forms of collective action, of how people
invest their material resources, especially when certain investments
threaten to disturb equality in wealth distribution. I want to begin
with the hypothesis, which I know is outrageous to American lawyers, that socialism is required by principles of justice; perhaps the
outrage can be diminished by emphasizing again that what I treat as
7. Capitalism and socialism can take many forms, of course. Rawls in particular contends
that principles of justice can be satisfied in systems of welfare capitalism or modest socialism.
See J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 273-74. For my purposes, it is unnecessary to specify more
particularly what forms of capitalism or socialism are at stake. According to Rawls, the choice
is indeterminate only behind the veil of ignorance, at what he treats as the stage of constitution-making. Given information about the real world, which of course the Supreme Court has,
the choice is determined in Rawls's scheme. Thus, Professor Tribe's third premise bars him
from saying that the choice between capitalism or socialism should be left to legislatures. In
addition, unless the Court can specify the choice, the enterprise of linking the Constitution and
distributive justice becomes completely uninteresting. With compensation, the state can expropriate at will, and can then redefine for the future what present holders of wealth can do with it
(pp. 463-65). Perhaps it is not as odd as it first seems that Professor Tribe appears to say that
the Constitution may limit - for reasons of autonomy and equality, terms that the discussion
of the state action doctrine below suggests are surrogates for private property - the legislature's ability to socialize property (p. 465). That reinforces the conclusion drawn above about
what the third premise entails. It also, not so incidentally, supports my later arguments about
Professor Tribe's conservatism.
8. I should note in passing another anomaly. Most political theories are universalistic, in
that they prescribe rules for action in societies of people generally. In this light, a work on
American constitutional law that is said to be guided by political philosophy is decidedly odd.
If the limitation were taken seriously, it would lead to far more troublesome implications than
Professor Tribe realizes. For a fine discussion, see J. DUNN, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY IN
THE FACE OF THE FUTURE 55-79 (1979).
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a hypothesis has been and remains a conclusion drawn by some
respected philosophers.9 How then could a socialist judge interpret
the Constitution to do justice?
In light of my definition of socialism, she would have to develop
two doctrines, one that specified a distribution of wealth and one
that allowed collective control of investment. It is not accidental, as
a certain element in the socialist camp would say, that she would in
fact have those doctrines at hand. Indeed, she could summarize a
complex argument by saying, "Socialism follows from Shelley v.
Kraemer and Gr!lftn v. Illinois." Those familiar with the standard
efforts in constitutional law courses to confine those cases may need
no elaboration, but for those whose memories of the argument have
faded, I shall expand it a bit.
Shelley v. Kraemer 10 held that the substantive requirements of
the fourteenth amendment came into play when a state court sought
to enforce a racially restrictive covenant in a deed of land between
two private parties. Of course, the case can be read narrowly, as one
involving race and a willing seller and buyer whose non-discriminatory decisions were blocked by judicial enforcement of the covenant.
But it can also be read broadly, as holding that state action exists,
and the substantive requirements of the Constitution are implicated,
whenever a court stands ready to enforce rights created by private
agreement. Now suppose the socialist judge confronts this case: The
People's Power Collective, enraged by the investment and pricing
policies of the Detroit Metropolitan Edison Company, invades the
Company's power plant and starts producing and distributing electricity according to new criteria. 11 The Company seeks an injunction
directing the Collective to leave the plant. Obviously, the judge sees,
Shelley v. Kramer means that the injunction would be state action;
whatever she does will affect the distribution of wealth in the society,
and she therefore must decide which resulting distribution the equal
protection clause requires.
Actually, the judge has a second arrow in her quiver of precedents. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 12 held that state action exists where "[t]he State has so far insinuated· itself into a
position of interdependence" with the nominally private action "that
it must be recognized as a joint participant." 13 Burton emphasizes
that the question of interdependence depends on the facts, and the
9. See J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 273-74.
10. 335 U.S. l (1948).
11. There are precedents, even in the United States. See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR ·
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 55 (1979). Of course, the typical response has been coercive repression,
but in such instances the lawsuit involving the Collective would simply take another form,
seeking damages for false arrest and assault, for example.
12. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
13. 365 U.S. at 725.
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socialist judge realizes that, on standard interpretations of the facts
about Metropolitan Edison, there is no interdependence. But facts
can be described with varying abstraction, and the judge decides to
talk about the interdependence of the state and the business community, of which the relationship between Michigan and Metropolitan
Edison is but one instance. She argues that the state depends on
business confidence to stabilize its environment so revenue will be
generated regularly, and that the business community depends on
the state to provide a ·secure framework for profitable transactions. 14
Is there anything wrong with those arguments? There are obviously some monumental objections of a legal realist sort. Justices
Vinson and Clark were no socialists, and they surely did not intend
Shelley and Burton to lay the foundations for socialism. Further, if
the socialist judge actually writes the opinion I have sketched, the
probability of reversal on appeal is vanishingly close to one. But
realist objections will not count against Tribe, as should be clear
from his tendentious, or in his own words "unconventional" and
"problematic," (p. 313 n.28) account of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 15 a decision that reeks of the American Enterprise Institute
but that Professor Tribe treats as recognizing rights to "basic government services" (p. 313). What matters, then, is what judges write,
not what they think, and Shelley and Burton can fairly be used as the
socialist judge wants.
I admit that I have not fully developed the socialist judge's argument. She has at hand, however, some important research aids:
commentary on the cases that says, for example, that Shelley cannot
mean what it said, because if it did we would have socialism, and
therefore continues with suggestions for limiting the case. 16 All she
has to do is stop after the first part of that commentary. But our
judge is not just a socialist; she is a conscientious and honest judge as
well and must worry about whether Shelley and Burton remain good
law in all their implications. As to Shelley, the answer is clear. Although the Court has never faced up to its implications and has decided cases that would have gone the other way had Shelley been at
the center of the argument, the implications of the case have never
been overtly repudiated, and the case is still cited with approval.
The only exception is Evans v. Abney, 17 allowing state law to authorize reversion of a bequest to residuary legatees if the discriminatory
intent of the testator cannot be fulfilled. Abney can be fairly treated
See Block, The Ruling Closs .Does Not Rule, 33 SOCIALIST REVOLUTION 7 (1977).
426 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed at pp. 308-18.
See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notesfar a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473
Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority - A Case Without Precedent, 61
COLUM L. REV. 1458 (1961).
17. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).

14.
15.
16.
(1962);
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as an aberration, or as dealing with the limited sphere of testamentary disposition of property.
The situation as to Burton is more complicated. Recent cases
seem to have narrowed what will count as interdependence, 18 and
Burton has tended to merge with a separate line of authority - that
state action exists where an ostensibly private actor performs a public function. 19 The current law is that a public function is one over
which the state has traditionally exercised a monopoly. 20 A conscientious judge can deal with the narrowing of interdependence, as I
have suggested, by arguing that it occurred when the Court used a
less abstract description of the facts, and that such a description does
not foreclose the business-confidence argument she has made. The
public function cases are harder for the conscientious socialist judge.
One line of defense is to recast the public function, from providing
electricity or zoning land to determining legal rights and duties.
That function has been, and indeed by definition must be, a state
monopoly. In this way, the public function cases become a straightforward deduction from Shelley. Here the only obstacle is the outrageous case of United States v. Kras, 21 of which Professor Tribe
disapproves precisely on monopoly grounds (p. 1009).22
Actually, at this stage the judge can rely on Professor Tribe even
more directly. His chapter on the state action doctrine treats it as an
"anti-doctrine" (p. 1147). I will do no more than point to the rhetorical excesses23 and the opacity of the formulations in the chapter,24
before noting that, to Professor Tribe, the state action question collapses into the question on the merits: "It is a problem . . . whose
solutions must currently be sought in perceptions of what we do not
want particular constitutional provisions to control" (p. 1174).25
Thus, the socialist judge can move confidently to the equal protection question, for if Metropolitan Edison's property rights are important; there is no state action, and if the Collective's forcible
18. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
19. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
20. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
21. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
22. See also pp. 1120-22 for a different criticism.
23. I would appreciate hearing from a reader who can explain how "[c)haos . . . may itself
be a form of order,'' p. 1149, without invoking the second law of thermodynamics.
24. See, e.g., pp. 1159, 1160. On p. i158: "The s!ate action requirement fixes a frame of
reference. The substantive constitutional right at issue initially determines the parameters of
this frame. Ultimately, however, it is the frame itself which determines the relevance of the
right to the inquiry." Professor Tribe must have caught more than a glimpse of his back in
front of him as he rounded the last bend in that circle.
25. I do not suppose that the word "currently" is intended to suggest that at some future
time the problem will receive a different solution. Rather, it suggests that definitions of substantive rights will vary over time, and thus points to the importance, subliminal in this instance, of the fourth premise.
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redistribution of property is justified, there is state action. This approach, which Professor Tribe suggests is novel (pp. 1160-61), simply
restates the balancing test proposed by Professor Henkin and
others.26 Unfortunately, in creating a polar case for that balance, the
law professors' parade of horribles - black children trooping across
the bigot's lawn on their way to school, invading his living room27 simultaneously assumes that private property must be taken as a
given - the horribles would not be horrible otherwise - and assimilates the bigot's lawn to Metropolitan Edison's power plant, as if
a principled socialism could not draw the obvious lines.
On the merits of the case, the leading precedent is Gr!lfin v. lllinois,28 in which the Court held that a state must provide a trial transcript to indigents seeking to appeal their convictions where it
requires transcripts for such appeals. Gr!lfin means that the state
may not rely solely on the market criterion, ability to pay, as a basis
for allocating at least some goods. Gr!lfin opens two questions for
discussion: what goods must be allocated by non-market criteria and
to what extent must considerations other than ability to pay govern
the allocation of goods? Once again, the socialist judge can rely on
the commentators who explore, sometimes with excitement29 and
sometimes with dread, 30 the implications of Gr!lfin.
The Supreme Court tried to limit the goods subject to Griffin in
the school .finance case, which said that it applied only to goods
(rights) "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."31
As Justice Marshall there points out, however, Griffin is unnecessary
for such goods; the constitutional right itself, standing alone and unsupported by notions of equality, prohibits allocation according to
the market. Thus, Griffin must apply to important, or in the terms
Professor Michelman draws from Rawls, basic goods, among which
are the material necessities of life.
The doctrinal formulation in the school finance case obscures a
more important element in the case: the Court's implicit acknowledgement that Griffin's scope was broad indeed. The case repeatedly
emphasized that no one contended that the education provided in
26. See Henkin, supra note 16.
27. Professor Tribe spots the parade on p. 1170.
28. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
29. See, e.g., Michelman, Foreword· On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
30. See, e.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
SUP. CT. REV. 41.
31. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). In light of my comments in note 35 iefra, I should state that I was one of Justice Marshall's Jaw clerks during the
term in which the school finance case was decided. I was only peripherally involved in the
work on Justice Marshall's opinion. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 6, at
258-59.
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property-tax-poor districts fell below some mm1m11m level, thus
coupling a broad scope for Gr!ffin with a limiting answer to the second question. Because we are concerned with Professor Tribe's
premises, we can put aside the fruitless controversy over standards of
review - strict scrutiny, minimal rationality, and all that. For, by
his third premise, the Court must decide whether a distribution of
wealth is justified, and cannot, except by arguments I will discuss in
the next section, rely on another agency's conclusion that the distribution is justified. The limiting answer to the second question has
generally been taken to be Professor Michelman's: a distribution of
wealth is justified as long as it meets minimum standards for satisfying just wants for basic goods. Professor Michelman constructed his
test by blending Rawlsian moral philosophy with decided Supreme
Court cases; that is, he relied on the third and fourth premises.
Michelman's minimum protection approach does specify one form
of political philosophy, but only the fourth premise justifies that
form instead of a more radical equalization approach.
My hypothesis in this Section has been that justice demands radical equality. Gr!ffin can be read to support that result, but later cases
seem to stand in the way. The socialist judge has several responses
to cases like the school finance case. First, they ~xplicitly rely on an
improper theory of judicial review; by deferring to the legislature
and not assessing the justice of the distribution of wealth, they erroneously rejected the third premise. Second, they were simply wrong;
to the extent that they relied on a theory of distributive justice, they
relied on one that was not supported by careful moral philosophy.
Finally, and I think most interesting, invocation of norms of distributive justice by the courts is, as I argue in Section II, fundamentally
a political act: it makes sense only if the political circumstances will
allow the decision to be used as part of an extended political process
that will ultimately achieve justice. The socialist judge can therefore
treat the limiting cases as sensible decisions in light of their political
circumstances. But obviously something has changed when a people's collective takes over a power plant, and it may be politically
appropriate to invoke the egalitarian standards demanded by principles of justice.
Now we have to see what Professor Tribe says. He begins with a
summary whose terms indicate his sympathies. The Warren Court,
he says, used "ardent rhetoric of equal justice for the poor, rhetoric
which promised more than even the Warren Court had delivered,"
and its decisions were "informed and perhaps generated" by an
"imaginative compassion for the plight of the poor" (pp. 1098-99).
He then reviews the decisions that are consistent with broad readings
of Gr!ffin. When he discusses the later decisions, Professor Tribe
criticizes their logic and their premises, suggesting that he would understand the socialist judge's second response to the limiting cases.
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But his concluding summary takes back what one might have
' thought Professor Tribe had given. He first explains the cases as refusing to deprive the rich of what their money can purchase, which is
a fair enough account but which, I confess, has no obvious connect_ion to justice absent the fourth premise. Then he concludes:
What emerges from the decisions of the past several years, then, is a
wavering commitment to maintain for the poor access to criminal justice and the political process; a possible, but not openly professed or
entirely consistent, belief in protection for the poor against the most
severe forms of deprivation with respect to education, nutrition, and
· welfare; and a determined, occasionally even activist, though again not
openly proclaimed, commitment to preserve for the non-poor ways of
purchasing distance and distinction from the less fortunate - to preserve, in effect, plenty of room at the top, without wholly abandoning
P!Otection at the bottom.
The vision animating the mix of aspirations is plainly not an egalitarian one, but it is not without its own elements of decency and concern; whatever the doctrinal stains, the Burger Court will not refuse
lifelines to those about to drown, even if it will throw them from a
point perched safely above the disquieting signs of distress - a point
from which the struggle to survive may not always be visible at all.
Whether the equal protection of the laws can survive this transfor-mation into minimal protection of the laws, with some of us very much
more equal than others, remains to be seen. It will depend in part on
just ftow minimal the protection provided at the bottom turns out to be.
_But it may also depend on the viability of a system that separates liberty from equality, and separates both from fraternity. [Pp. 1135-36].

All that is well and good (although one wonders when lifelines
will be thrown if the throwers cannot see the struggle). We know
from it that Professor Tribe is fair-minded and even-handed, and
that his heart is in the right place (that is, on his sleeve). But the
tension between the third and fourth premises is evident, unless we
agree that distributive justice demands only that lifelines be thrown .
. There ~re reasons to think that it demands more.
I have been sketching what might be called a direct argument for
socialism, invoking only standards of distributive justice or equality.
There is an indirect argument for socialism as well, invoking standards of liberty. That argument, I believe, seriously reduces the degree to which minimum protection or lifeline theories of distributive
justice are plausible. Here too a moral philosopher could use
Supreme Court cases to illustrate the argument, though not to sup: port it. The argument assumes that basic liberties - to speak, vote,
and so on - ought to be preserved, and then claims, on the basis of
supstantial empirical evidence, that significant inequalities in the distribution of material wealth make it impossible to preserve those lib-

·-
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erties. 32 An incidental example can be found in the absence of
freedom of speech in the workplace, so that whistleblowers may be
fired at their employers' will, a result that I suspect would be hard to
support under any plausible moral theory. But the examples from
contemporary constitutional law are themselves important. In Buckley v. Valeo 33 the Court held unconstitutional limits on individual
expenditures on behalf of candidates for political office, and in First
National Bank v. Bellotti34 it struck down expenditure limitations on
corporate promotion of political views. Although Professor Tribe argues that the decisions can be limited (1979 Supp., p. 59 n.14), their
message for those who find the indirect argument for socialism persuasive is that the fourth premise must be rejected, for the Court has,
as Professor Tribe acknowledges, embedded in constitutional law a
prohibition on legislative efforts to reduce the power that wealth
brings to its owners (p. 1135).
The Court in Bellotti was seriously divided, and one can conclude from. that fact alone that the first three premises are, at this
point, unimpaired: the materials available for constitutional decision would allow us to interpret the Constitution so that it embodied
principles of justice.35 But those three premises yield indeterminate
results. It is only the fourth premise that allows Professor Tribe to
get anywhere at all in his work. Yet it should be clear by now how
ideo\pgical that premise is. The commentary attempting to limit
Sheffey and Burton, and the recent monopolization cases, are explicitly animated by concern that prior state action doctrine might be
used to socialize private property. The lesson of Bellotti is equally
clear. In the absence of the fourth premise, a normative theorist
might simply reject those concerns as wrong. Given the fourth
premise, though, we must conclude that only capitalism is justified
by political philosophy.
Perhaps, however, I should not take the fourth premise as seriously as I do. What I call a premise, after all, may simply be an
artifact of Professor Tribe's enterprise: if one wants to write a treaThe argument is most forcefully made in C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS
cited, with the author's name misspelled, in 1979 Supp., p. 77 n.12.
424 U.S. l (1976).
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
A footnote on the ethics of treatise-writing is warranted. After Bellotti, the City of
Boston argued that it, a municipal corporation, had to be allowed to spend money in a political
campaign; Justice Brennan, who dissented in Bellotti, turned the screws on the majority in
issuing a stay so that the city could do so. City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389 (1978).
The Supreme Court denied plenary review after the election had ended. 439 U.S. 1060 (1979).
In the 1979 Supplement, which notes Anderson at 57 n.4, Professor Tribe argues that several
cases "may . . . represent . . . a deeper and wider trend in our constitutional law: municipal
corporations are increasingly being differentiated from mere arms of the state itself." (1979
Supp., p. 31 ). Readers could better assess that suggestion if they were told that Professor Tribe
represented Boston in Anderson and other cases. See 47 U.S.L.W. 33?3 (Nov. 21, 1978).
32.
(1977),
33.
34.
35.
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tise on American constitutional law, instead of a work that is labelled moral philosophy, one is obliged to tell one's audience what
current law is. I admit that there are elements in the treatise that do
seem to be artifacts. The most notable is Professor Tribe's central
organizing scheme. He presents "seven models of constitutional
law'' on the first page as both heuristic and historical. It is hard to
avoid the feeling that Professor Tribe uses those models in a rather
forced way. The chapter on the state action doctrine, for example, is
tacked on at the end; Model III (takings and the contract clause)
occupies 17 pages; and Model VII (structural justice) occupies only
10. Model III seems to be simply a way to combine in one chapter
the discussion of two clauses that other text writers discuss in two.
Model-building may thus be as much an attempt to differentiate Professor Tribe's product from others as it is an intellectual enterprise.
But the fourth premise is not the same kind of artifact; it is essential to Professor Tribe's work. My extended hypothetical case is
designed to show that the first three premises yield only indeterminate results without some external source of normative judgments.
The third premise confines results tfwe have a theory of justice. But
the currently fashionable way of developing such a theory is through
systematic moral philosophy, not through examining what the
Supreme Court has said. Professor Tribe in effect proposes an alternative: capitalism is required not because it satisfies standards of
justice developed in systematic moral theory but because the
Supreme Court has over time defended it. The fourth premise is the
motor of this alternative, and is therefore a true premise. Indeed, it
is an essential premise to any effort that uses decided cases as the
framework for developing a law that is consistent with justice. Diverse and sometimes conflicting lines of precedent pervade every
area of law, and the standard tools of legal reasoning allow us to use
those lines to any end we choose. But then decided cases cannot
guide us to justice: we must find it for the future either by moral
philosophy alone or by agreeing that the law - as it is occasionally
stated by judges who are not primarily moral philosophers - embodies justice.
The fourth premise might be defended as an essential element in
a Dworkinian best theory of constitutional law, "morally the strongest" theory among those that provide a reasonably "good fit" with
the decided cases, "particularly recent decisions." 36 There are, however, two difficulties, each fatal to Professor Tribe's enterprise. First,
the strongest available moral theory may still be extremely flaccid,
and Professor Tribe's second and third premises demand something
more than a flaccid moral theory. Second, the Shel/ey-Gr!ffin argument demonstrates that theories which, to the legal profession at
36. Dworkin, Seven Critics, Il GA. L.

REV.

1201, 1252 (1977).
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least, are wildly eccentric, fit the cases well enough to be among
those from which the best theory must be selected, especially if, as
Dworkin permits, we may reject some decisions as mistakes. Then,
however, we need arguments for the moral theory chosen as best that
are independent of the decided cases, and it is precisely such arguments that Professor Tribe's fourth premise precludes.
The Burkean theme is, I think, the only way to make sense of
Professor Tribe's work. I have argued elsewhere that Burkean constitutional theory is impossible;37 it is enough here to allude to Professor Bickel's hints at such a theory as a way of suggesting the
difficulty of the endeavor.38 One thing should be noted, though: if
Professor Tribe's fourth premise commits him to a Burkean theory, I
find it hard to understand his basis for criticizing any line of cases
even as moderately as he does. That is, the Burkeanism of the fourth
premise contradicts the rationalism with which ·Professor Tribe infuses the third premise.

B. Coordination and Institutionalism: Federalism
The next step in my argument questions Professor Tribe's interpretation of the third premise, but it is best made indirectly. The
argument from liberty to socialism suggests that liberty can be preserved only if relatively small permanent combinations of wealth
and therefore of political power are allowed. But that raises questions about the ability of socialist society to produce levels of material well-being that require large-scale activity. A socialist must
therefore give some account of how small units can coordinate their
activities.
In constitutional law, that account is provid.ed by the law of federalism, whose concern is precisely how we can assure sufficient
power in the national government to guarantee adequate coordination without at the same time concentrating power so much that liberty is threatened. Political philosophers have suggested two
methods to reach that end; American constitutional law is interesting
here because the Framers attempted to devise a third method, whose
failure is instructive. The philosophers say that coordination can be
accomplished either by a rule requiring unanimous agreement
before action can be taken or by a rule of majority agreement. 39 In
the American setting, those rules are mirrored in the choice between
a confederation of states and a federal nation.
37. See Tushnet, JJarkness on the Edge of Town: 'flze Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional 'flzeory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1039-42 (1980).
38. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
39. Nozick argues for the unanimity rule and Rawls for majority rule at the legislative
stage, though he requires unanimity at the constitutional stage..
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The Framers, of course, rejected the unanimity rule, 40 and contemporary constitutional law therefore provides little insight into the
philosophers' problems. But it might be possible to use the institution of judicial review as a mechanism for determining the subjects
as to which unanimity was required in a mixed system. Had it been
used that way, we could look at the cases for guidance on the philosophical issue. However, the Court has, with brief exception, consistently followed the majority rule approach in its federalism
decisions, treating congressional power as plenary in cases involving
national power and assuming that congressional decisions can override local decisions in cases involving state power. The exception is
the period from 1896 to 1936, when the Court imposed federalism
constraints on the exercise of national power. No coherent doctrine
emerged during that period, nor has one come since.41
Two conclusions may follow from the constitutional law of federalism. The territorial units that underlie federalism in the United
States may still be too large to guarantee both liberty and coordination; certainly the mental pictures one draws of Robert Nozick's utopia and Roberto Unger's organic groups are those of units rather
smaller than California. Then too, there may be a more general
point. Professor Tribe's treatment of federalism obscures this point
completely, even though it seems to be the only question about federalism that a moral philosopher would find interesting. Professor
Tribe provides chapters on federalism whose primary analytic point
is the inability of the Supreme Court to develop federalism restraints
on national power even though federalism is designed to protect liberty (in his Model I, of "Separated and Divided Powers") (pp. 1-4).
Given the fourth premise, the emphasis on decided cases is unsurprising, but it comes close to abandoning the third premise. What
would be of interest is something to which Professor Tribe alludes
only in passing: the Court has its chance to talk about federalism
and national power only when Congress has acted, and yet the constitutional division of subjects between state and nation may be better revealed if we look at what Congress does not do, that is, at
subjects as to which, at least provisionally, coordination can be
reached only by unanimous agreement (p. 224). The Court's failure
to define when unanimity is required may mean that there is no necessary connection between institutional arrangements such as judicial review and the substantive requirements of justice. The next
Section explores that general point drawn from Professor Tribe's
treatment of federalism and the tensions between the third and
fourth premises that his treatment reveals.
40. Aficionados will note U.S. CONST. art. V, proviso 2.
41. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

In this section I develop two challenges to the third premise.
First, the Burkean theme makes it difficult to defend the interpretation of that premise which Professor Tribe follows; there are theories
of justice that would not allow Professor Tribe to move from substantive principles of justice to the assertion that the Court should
follow those principles. Second, and for me more interesting, even if
one accepts Professor Tribe's notion of what justice requires, or indeed any theory of justice that specifies outcomes, one probably
should not accept his assertion about what the Court should do;
there are reasons to think that the outcomes will sometimes not be
reached by that route.
The first challenge is, in one of its forms, the general institutionalist challenge to judicial review. Assuming that the Constitution is
designed to secure justice, the challenge goes, what reason is there to
think that the Supreme Court will better serve justice than legislatures? Professor Tribe in essence ignores the challenge, and when it
is stated in the ordinary way, I think he does so correctly. The ordi.:.
nary form leads to a morass from which no one has emerged more
enlightened, or enlightening, than before. For Professor Tribe,
therefore, institutional concerns have only a limited relevance to
substantive ones (p. 14).
But he should not be let off so easily just because the ordinary
form of the institutionalist challenge is unhelpful. There are indeed
interpretations of justice to which institutional concerns have almost
no relevance. These interpretations evaluate the outcomes of social
activities according to some substantive criteria. Nozick calls them
"patterned" theories of justice,42 and it is of course true that if one
holds a patterned theory, in which only outcomes matter, one can
move rather directly from theory to doctrine, subject to qualifications discussed below. But patterned theories are not the only ones
available in political philosophy. For example, there are also what
might be called process theories, in which outcomes are evaluated
according to criteria that speak only to the manner in which the outcomes were reached. Obviously, Professor Tribe's approach is acceptable only if some patterned theory, instead of some process
theory, satisfies the requirements of justice. In a way, this difficulty
recapitulates the underlying problem discussed in Section I. There
we saw the odd consequences of assuming that the Supreme Court
has resolved controversies that continue to excite political philosophers; here we see Professor Tribe assuming that he has done the
same, aided by "historical givens" about the Supreme Court (p. 12).
I suspect that a serious Burkean could explain the connection be42. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 156 {1974).
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tween judicial and academic behavior in an interesting way, but I
know that, once again, Professor Tribe has not followed lines that
would open if he attempted to defend his premises.
Even as reformulated, the institutionalist challenge is rather
uninteresting, because there appear to be no contemporary political
philosophies that are purely process theories. 43 For questions on
which the majority (or the process specified by the theory) should
not rule, then, one who accepts the first two premises will have to
accept the third as well. Let us assume, therefore, that constitutional
theory allows the Supreme Court to say that at least some legislative
decisions are inconsistent with principles of justice. At this point the
second challenge arises, for it does not follow that the Court should
impose what justice requires. The challenge here is different from
the institutionalist one, because we have assumed that it is permissible to override majoritarian or process decisions. Rather, the challenge is political.
I think it helpful to invoke Rawls and the economic theory of
second best here. Rawls, to whom Professor Tribe is obviously, and
with good reason, attracted, develops a theory of justice that assumes
a society in which the conditions of justice are almost secure.44 In
such a society, it might make sense for a court to rectify the occasional deviations from justice by directly imposing what justice requires. But where the deviations from justice are substantial in
degree and widespread. in scope, as they are in the contemporary
United States under the theories of both Rawls and Nozick, such
actions may not be sensible. The economic theory of second best
holds that, where there are numerous deviations from the conditions
that guarantee Pareto optimality, there is no reason, in general, to
think that alleviating one deviation will yield outcomes that are
more efficient than existed before; changes can be justified only by a
detailed examination of the precise setting in which the occasion for
decision arises.
I do not know whether the analogy to political action has been
rigorously developed, but it certainly has strong intuitive force. Acts
that alleviate the immediate problem may, by reducing political
pressure, delay the rectification of other, perhaps greater injustices.
Examples of recent constitutional law from the campaign against
segregation and from the welfare rights movement reveal the necessity of careful political analysis: constitutional decisions like Brown
v. Board ofEducation 45 amplified the political forces seeking equal43. Burkean theory is completely undeveloped, probably because it is ultimately incoherent too. My colleague Warren Lehman is currently attempting to resurrect what I call
Burkean theory.
44. See J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 245-49.
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ity, while decisions like Goldberg v. Kel!y4 6 at least arguably diminished those forces, first by deflecting them into a fruitless struggle
against a bureaucracy that readily swallowed the Court-prescribed
dose of due process without any change in symptoms, and second by
bolstering the idea that fairness was not far away in the American
welfare state.
The socialist judge of Section I might, after political reflection,
conclude that the circumstances did not favor a socialist revolution
when the collective acted, and might therefore interpret the state
i;i.ction doctrine or the equal protection clause to require that the requested injunction be issued. That course is not an easy one to follow. The judge must consciously decide to perpetuate an existing
injustice that hurts real people present before her, so that an indefinite but, it is hoped, larger number of people will be hurt less in the
more or less distant future. The problem is not unfamiliar to political philosophers, who have discussed it under the heading of "dirty
hands."47 Professor Tribe treats it as a nonproblem, and perhaps the
philosophers will someday prove him right. But the satisfaction with
contemporary American society that is evident in the fourth premise,
rather than serious philosophical reflection, animates the way Professor Tribe interprets the third premise.
As these comments suggest, the third and fourth premises are
linked, not by some rigorous logic, but by a more general way of
thinking, which I like to think of as the Burkean conservative side of
contemporary liberalism. Though liberals think differently, politics
ain't beanbag, as has been said before. The politics of liberalism, as
exemplified by Professor Tribe's work, are inherently conservative.
They assume that contemporary American society approximates a
just society; thus, both the fourth premise, which is explicit on the
point, and the third premise, interpreted in the Rawlsian way discussed above, make sense. They also, and concomitantly, deny the
need for massive and therefore probably violent changes in the structure of the society. In this respect, Professor Tribe is the quintessential liberal, a term that, it should be clear, is not one I regard as one
of honor. Constitutional theory poses problems in political philosophy; liberals take pains to construct their premises, which in the nature of things receive almost no examination, so that those problems
are obscured.

III.

CONCLUSION

Tribe-trashing is something of a thing to do these days,48 and I
46. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
47. Walzer, Political Action - The Problem of JJirty Hands, 2 PHILOSOPHY &
160 (1973).
48. See, e.g., Bodine, Harvard's Hustler, Natl. L.J., Oct. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
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therefore want to emphasize that my final comments are directed at
the present state of constitutional scholarship, of which Professor
Tribe's treatise is, for these purposes, only an example. I hope that
what has gone before raises a serious puzzle: how could so morally
obtuse a work be taken so seriously? The answer can be found in
Professor Tribe's ambition, which, like that of constitutional scholars
generally, lies outside the world of scholarship and in the world of
contemporary public affairs. Not that there is anything intrinsically
wrong with ambition. Its rewards, enumerated by Ward Just as
honor, power, riches, fame, and the love of women,49 are, with one
obvious modification, nothing to be sneered at. Most of us have
imagined ourselves as Justices of the Supreme Court, and Professor
Tribe, whose chances are better than those of the rest of us, 50 would
surely be a better Justice than many.
The question, though, is to what activities the rewards of ambition accrue. In the world of public affairs, they accrue not necessarily to intellectual substance. One who addresses the real questions of
justice is by that fact alone disqualified from serious consideration
for public position and influence, because raising those questions
raises in tum questions about the worth of the positions that now
exist, to be occupied or influenced. Under the circumstances, I take
some pleasure, not however unmixed with regret, in noting that the
Framers would have understood the phenomenon that Professor
Tribe's work represents: they called it corruption.51

49. W. JUST, HONOR, POWER, RICHES, FAME, AND THE LOVE OF WOMEN (1978).
50. I do offer Professor Tribe two bits of gratuitous advice. The track record of appointments of academics to the Supreme Court is weak indeed, as some of Professor Tribe's own
colleagues could tell him. And I pass on an observation by Judge Henry Friendly, who ought
to know about this question: "Don't take one job expecting that it will lead to another."
51. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1968).

